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Budgets are important economic policy instruments and play a key role in promoting public welfare. The quality of budget management determines the extent to which budget policies 
support achievement of national goals. Accordingly in 2003, as part 
of its program of reform and as a sign of its intention to restore the 
original purposes of State budgeting, the Indonesian government 
passed a new law (No 17/2003) on State Finances. This was the first 
time since independence in 1945 that Indonesia had modernized 
its finance laws: previously, those laws had been based on the Dutch 
budgetary system called Indische Compatabiliteitswet (better 
known as ICW). 
Almost a decade on from the enactment of Law No. 17/2003, 
it has to be said that Indonesia’s State budgets are not yet fully 
effective instruments for the distribution of State fiscal resources. 
Various problems adversely affect not only budget formulation and 
procedures, but also budget implementation. This Budget Brief has 
grown out of the reflections that have informed FITRA’s budget 
advocacy thus far. It is, therefore, not meant to provide answers to 
every current budgetary issue; but, rather, it will hopefully act as a 
catalyst for future budgetary reform both in terms of ideas and as a 
technical budget guide. 
As one of the countries that launched the Open Government 
Partnership initiative, Indonesia should make budgetary 
reform a principal component of its national agenda in order to 
enhance levels of budget transparency, public participation and 
accountability in Indonesia.1
1 Among the preconditions and purposes of the Open Government Partnership 
(OPG) are budget transparency and public participation. For further information 
on OPG and “Open Government Indonesia”, see http://www.opengovpartnership.
org/ and http://opengovindonesia.org/
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Table 1. Eight Key Documents That Should be Publicly Available
no. Document Content
1  Pre Budget Statement Budget projections and macro-economic indicators, also called 
Principal Budget Policies and Macro-economic Settings
2 Citizens’ Budget Simple versions of the draft and enacted APBN to make them more 
readable for the general public
3 Executive’s Budget Proposal The Government’s Fiscal Statement, draft APBN, ministry/
agency work plans and budgets (RKA-K/L) and other supporting 
documentation
4 Enacted Budget Enacted law on APBN, and Budget Implementation Checklists (DIPA)
5 In-Year Reports Monthly or three monthly reports on budget implementation/
outcomes
6 Mid Year Review Mid-year report on budget progress
7 Year End Report End-of-year fiscal report (LKPP)
8 Audit Report Audit report of the national Audit Board
Recommendations: Revision of the 
Law on State Finances should contain 
clear parameters for maximizing public 
welfare, including a requirement that 
bureaucratic spending be effective and 
efficient. Parameters for maximizing 
public welfare could specify that 
constitutionally guaranteed citizens’ 
rights should be fleshed out in 
budgets, leading to expenditure of 
more substantial fiscal resources on 
promotion of public welfare. 
The revised law should also guarantee 
public access to all budget documents 
and to information on the entire 
budgetary process. According to an 
“Open Budget Index” published by 
the International Budget Partnership 
(IBP), there are eight key budget 
documents that should be made 
publicly available (see Table 1)2. In 
addition, the public should participate 
2 For more information on the Open Budget 
Index, see: http://internationalbudget.org/what-
we-do/open-budget-survey/
Constitutional Intent still not spelt out in  
law on State Finances
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Table 2. Dates of Plenary DPR Sessions and Timing of Completion of Budget Discussions
fiscal Year
Date of Plenary 
session enacting 
aPbn
Deadline for Completion of  
Discussion of budget Detail
Revised 2010 APBN 3 May 2010 Section 16c of Law No APBNP 2010 : 15 May 2010
2011 APBN 26 October 2010 Finance Minister Circular Letter No. SE-676/MK.02/2010: 12 November 2010
Revised 2011 APBN 22 July 2011 Finance Minister Circular Letter No. SE-442/MK.02/2011: 16 August 2011
2012 APBN 28 October 2011 Finance Minister Circular Letter No. SE-01/MK.2/2011: 14 November 2011 
finances should also provide space for 
public comment on draft APBNs before 
their enactment. Also, given that APBN 
laws only remain in force for one budget 
year, the timeframe for judicial reviews of 
APBN laws by the Constitutional Court 
should be before the commencement of 
the actual budget year in question.
Pro-forma DPr enactment of aPbns – Opportunity for 
secret budget Discussions
The situation: Section (5) paragraph 
15 of Law No. 17/2003 reads: “APBNs 
as approved by the DPR shall contain 
details of organizational units, functions, 
programs, activities and kinds of 
expenditure”. In practice, the DPR does 
not observe this provision of the law. In 
fact, its enactment in plenary session 
of APBN laws continues to be a largely 
pro-forma exercise, given that discussion 
of the detail of APBNs continues after 
formal enactment (see Table 2 below). 
A case in point is the lump sum of Rp 
1.1 trillion appropriated for budget 
“optimization” in the revised 2010 
budget: those funds were divided up 
amongst DPR sectoral commissions for 
discussion with government counterparts 
after enactment of the budget in plenary. 
Such discussions took place in secret: the 
general public and the media could no 
longer monitor the situation because they 
believed the budget discussion phase 
was over and done with. And there is a 
further problem: APBNs as enacted into 
law do not contain full funding details—
by type, organizational unit, function, 
program and activity—but rather feature 
broad funding ceilings under various 
budget headings. Expenditure details are 
contained in separate documentation 
including basic APBN data and 
Presidential regulations (providing 
details of budget allocations). 
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Recommendations: A plenary DPR 
session held to enact an APBN law should 
be the DPR’s final decision taken on that 
APBN; and APBNs as enacted should 
contain all the information required 
in Section 15 of Law No. 17/2003. 
Discussion of the detail of an APBN 
should not be permitted after its formal 
enactment in plenary session. In addition, 
all budget-related documentation—
government financial statements, basic 
budgetary data and full details of budget 
allocations (thus far made known by 
Presidential regulation)—should be 
attached to the APBN law and form 
an integral part of it. This should not 
be impossible to achieve, given that 
it is already happening at the local 
government level in Indonesia: full 
details of budgetary spending—by 
activity/item of expenditure—are 
attached to regulations approving local 
government budgets. 
budget “Optimizing” Process Unregulated – 
susceptible to Politicization
above, in the revised 2010 APBN, 
the DPR set aside Rp 1.1 trillion for 
subsequent discussion by its 11 sectoral 
commissions—Rp 100 billion per 
commission. A similar situation arises 
in the case of so called “infrastructure 
adjustment” funding, also financed 
by optimization funds: that money—
transferred to regions as part of central 
fiscal balance funding—is fertile ground 
for budget mafia activity. Indeed it has 
already ensnared several members of 
the DPR’s Budget Committee. 
Recommendations: The MD3 law 
referred to above or the DPR’s standing 
orders should lay down unequivocal 
procedures for allocation of funds 
identified in budget “optimization” 
discussions, given that such funds 
are susceptible to politicization, are 
often misdirected and are liable to 
misappropriation. It is, therefore, 
recommended that budget optimization 
funds be used solely to reduce budget 
deficits, thereby obviating the need for 
government to take on new debt. 
The situation: Section 15, Paragraph (3) 
of Law No. 17/2003 on State Finances 
enshrines the right of the DPR to propose 
amendments to draft APBNs or to suggest 
changes to income and expenditure 
levels contained in them provided such 
proposals do not result in deficits. But, 
in practice, the DPR is hard pressed to 
modify expenditure proposals submitted 
to it by the executive, given that it lacks 
the necessary capability and cannot 
present solid supporting argumentation. 
So what often happens is that, on the 
expenditure side, the DPR streamlines or 
cuts spending proposed by government; 
and, on the revenue side, it pressures 
government to increase revenue figures. 
The result of these discussions is a pool 
of uncommitted funds normally referred 
to as budget “optimization” funding. 
Unfortunately, however, Law No. 27/2009 
(known as MD3) on Indonesia’s elective 
institutions—the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (MPR), the DPR, Regional 
Representative Assemblies (DPRDs) and 
the Council of Regional Representatives 
(DPD)—lays down no mechanism for 
this “optimizing” process. As mentioned 
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budget blocking: fertile Ground for  
rent seekers
The situation: For as long as a budget 
item is marked with an asterisk it is 
blocked and its funding cannot be 
disbursed by the ministry/agency 
concerned. An examination by FITRA 
of the 2011 APBN has revealed that 
6 101 items of central government 
expenditure to the value of Rp 63.4 
trillion were blocked in this way. 
Both the Ministry of Finance and 
the DPR can block budget items. The 
former usually blocks an item on the 
grounds that it lacks full supporting 
documentation such as terms of 
reference; that land for construction 
of a building is not yet available; 
or that proposed expenditure is at 
variance with set standards. Budget 
blocking by the DPR, on the other 
hand, indicates that the responsible 
ministry/agency and the DPR—be it 
a sectoral commission or the DPR’s 
Budget Committee—have not yet 
reached agreement and, for that to 
occur, further discussion and receipt 
of additional information by the DPR 
are required. According to records in 
the Directorate-General of Budgeting, 
as of 6 January 2012, ministry/agency 
work plans and budgets to the value of 
Rp 78.5 billion are still being blocked 
by DPR sectoral commissions. This 
blocking process provides further 
opportunities for budget mafias to 
ply their wares, given that lobbying 
on blocked items takes place via non-
public processes and unblocking them 
needs only to be agreed by the relevant 
sectoral commission’s leadership or 
a sectoral commission’s DPR Budget 
Committee representative. For example, 
funding for the “Wisma Atlet” venture 
was originally a blocked budget item 
that was subsequently unblocked by way 
of undercover agreement. There is no 
provision whatsoever in the Law on State 
Finances for the DPR to block budget 
expenditure. In fact, such action infringes 
the law’s provision that the DPR should 
approve the detail of APBNs down to 
the level of program activities. It follows 
that once the DPR in plenary session has 
enacted an APBN, no further discussion 
of asterisked (blocked) items in that 
budget should occur. 
Recommendations: The DPR’s practice of 
inserting asterisks to block budget items 
should be terminated. The blocking of 
budgetary spending should be done only 
by the Minister of Finance and should 
be no more than an administrative 
procedure. As for budget items the DPR 
has not yet agreed to, they should not 
be blocked but rather put forward for 
re-discussion with government as part 
of the mid-year budget revision process. 
And, in that context, it is recommended 
that a parliamentary budget office be 
established to support the DPR in its 
discussion of the effectiveness and 
efficiency of budget proposals. These 
steps would remove the need for the DPR 
to asterisk, or block, particular items in 
an enacted budget. 
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rewards & Penalties, and non-Transparent budget 
Implementation – Causes of Under-expenditure
Half-Hearted budget Transparency – approved budgets 
should be Published in full
Recommendations: In an effort to speed 
up dispersal of budgetary spending the 
government has this year (2012) formed 
a Budget Expenditure Oversight and 
Evaluation Team (known as TEPPA) and 
has begun to publish quarterly progress 
reports on budget implementation. But 
this measure should not be a temporary 
one: in future, the government should 
publish quarterly progress reports on the 
budget spending of all ministries/agencies 
so that under-performers and bottlenecks 
can be identified from the outset. If after 
6 months a ministry/agency has spent 
less than 50% of its budget allocations, it 
should be penalized by having its budget 
for the second half of the year cut to the 
level of its expenditure for the first six 
months. Rewards for good performance 
in one fiscal year should be paid out 
at the beginning of the next. It is also 
recommended that rewards and penalties 
should not be restricted to adjustments 
of funding levels of ministries/agencies 
concerned, but should also be applied to 
remuneration paid to those in control 
of those budgets. This measure should 
be implemented as an integral part of 
bureaucratic reform. 
The situation: Claims by government 
and the DPR that budgetary processes 
are already open are not entirely accu-
rate. The only State budget docu ments 
available on the Ministry of Finance’s 
website are government financial 
statements, draft laws on APBNs and 
(after APBNs are enacted) Presidential 
decrees containing APBN details. Other 
important documents—the very ones 
that should invite inputs from the general 
public—are not published: two sets of 
documents—ministry/agency Work 
Plans and Budgets (RKA K/L) containing 
the detail of APBNs and Budget Imple­
mentation Checklists (DIPAs)—are 
The situation: APBN legislation has 
introduced a system of rewards and 
penalties to encourage ministries/agencies 
to improve their budget expenditure 
performance: those unable to spend 
their budgets on time are penalized by 
having their budget allocations cut, while 
those with good expenditure levels are 
rewarded with extra budgetary funding. 
The problem is that rewards—based on 
the preceding fiscal year’s expenditure 
performance—are not paid out until the 
(mid-year) budget revision stage of the 
next budget year; in practice that leaves 
less than six months for the rewarded 
ministry/agency to spend its extra 
funding. The result is that, instead of 
encouraging more effective expenditure, 
rewards for good performance make it 
more difficult for recipients to sustain 
good budget realization performance. 
The truth is that, if ministries/agencies 
stuck to the cash flows contained in their 
Budget Performance Checklists (DIPAs), 
under-expenditure need not occur at all. 
But unfortunately in-year progress reports 
on budget spending are not currently 
published on a periodic basis (be it 
monthly or quarterly). 
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through to end-of-year reports on budget 
outcomes—should be in open/accessible 
formats and lay-outs (lists or sheets of 
data) making it easier for researchers 
or the general public to use them and 
register inputs on them3. Such practices 
would streng then the DPR’s budgetary 
role and enhance its standing in the 
eyes of the general public; and would, 
at the same time, increase its budgetary 
bargaining power vis-à-vis government. 
If ministry/agency RKAs were published 
at the moment of their submission 
by government to the DPR, cases of 
misappropriation of funds and corrupt 
designs on budget allocations could be 
nipped in the bud. 
3 A global initiative to present data in an open 
and easy to use format is now being acted 
upon in many countries: see http://www.data.
gov/opendatasites/ 
Disjointed Information systems for budget Planning,  
funding allocation & budget Outcomes
The situation: Two State institutions 
are responsible for budget planning: 
the National Development Planning 
Agency (Bappenas) and the Ministry of 
Finance. Bappenas formulates work plans 
for government and for each ministry/
agency; within the Ministry of Finance, 
the Directorate-General of Budgeting 
has oversight of ministry/agency work 
plans and budgets (RKAs) and budget 
implementation checklists (DIPAs), while 
the Directorate-General of Treasury 
oversees recording of and reporting on 
budget outcomes. Blondal, Hawkesworth 
and Coi (2009) point out that Indonesia’s 
budgetary systems are atypical: in OECD 
countries planning and budgetary 
submitted by the executive to the DPR 
for dis cussion, but are not publicly 
available. If these documents were 
published, the community would be able 
to comment on them and offer inputs 
on proposed spending before APBNs 
are enacted. Also, most budget data 
published by government is formatted 
in ways—e.g. in PDF format—that make 
them difficult to use and analyze; that 
impedes efforts of researchers and civil 
society generally to examine the data and 
register their inputs. 
Recommendations: Government and 
the DPR should be required to publish 
ministry/agency Work Plans and Budgets 
(RKA K/L). The DPR should also be 
obliged to conduct public hearings on 
draft APBNs with community groups so 
that the public can register their input on 
what is proposed. In addition, all budget 
data—from ministry/agency RKAs right 
functions are brought together in one 
single budget office and are not separated 
as they are in Indonesia.4 
The problem is that the three authorities 
referred to above all use different 
reporting systems: Bappenas uses one 
for its ministry/agency work plans; the 
Directorate-General of Budgeting uses 
another for its ministry/agency work 
plans and budgets (RKA-K/L) and its 
ministry/agency budget implementation 
checklists (DIPA); and the Directorate-
General of Treasury uses yet another for 
4 Jon R. Blondal, Ian Hawkeswoth dan Hyun-
Deok Choi, 2009. Budgeting in Indonesia. 
OECD Journal on Budgeting.
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Recommendations: One single integrated 
budget information and reporting system 
should apply to all budget documentation 
from initial government and ministry/
agency work plans, to RKA-K/Ls, 
DIPAs, quarterly progress reports on 
budget implementation right through 
to end-of-year budget outcome reports 
and central government fiscal reports 
(LKPPs). The system should also contain 
information on the origin, processing 
and funding of budget programs and 
activities during planning, discussion by 
the DPR, in quarterly implementation 
reports and in end-of-year performance 
and budget outcome reports. It should 
be a transparent system accessible by 
the general public and containing the 
information in schema below.
The DPR should produce adequate 
documentation on the exercise of its 
mandate to discuss draft APBNs, covering 
such items as: budget line items subject 
to revision; the nature of revisions made; 
the identity of DPR members proposing 
revisions; and their reasons for doing so. 
its recording and reporting of budget 
outcomes. These differing reporting 
systems make for a disjointed budget 
information system and complicate 
efforts to track the history of a particular 
budget item: was funding for it abolished/
reduced/increased at the RKA-K/L stage, 
during DPR discussions, or maybe even 
at the DIPA stage? Or was it an item 
suggested out of the blue during DPR 
discussion of the APBN? In the case 
of items whose allocations have been 
reduced, one aspect to be tracked is 
consequential effects on its performance 
indicators. It is very possible that budget 
allocations are currently being reduced 
without any adjustment of targeted 
outcomes. The lack of an integrated 
budget information system also makes 
it difficult for policy makers or the 
general public to assess the effectiveness 
of spending on a particular program 
or activity. For now, neither the public 
nor the DPR can tell whether realized 
budget expenditure is in accord with 
original planning and has achieved targets 
originally set. 
Ministry/Agency Work 
Plans (Renja K/Ls)
•  Information on importance of/need for programs, 
performance indicators, locations, funding levels and 
forward estimates
Ministry/Agency 
Work Plans & Budgets     
(RKA-K/Ls)-K/Ls)
•  Information hitherto included in RKA-KLs;
•  Explanation of changes to funding or performance 
outomes at time of submission to D-G of  Budgeting 
Budget Implementation 
Checklists (DIPAs)
•  Information hitherto included in DIPAs
•  Explanation of changes to funding or performance 
outcomes during DPR discussion; if asterisked, reason for 
being blocked
Quarterly Budget 
Implementation Progress 
Reports
•  Quarterly reports on budget implementation and 
achievement of desired outcomes
•  Explanation of  delays in budget implementation
Budget Outcome Reports  
(LRAs)
•  Information hitherto included in LRAs
•  Budget outcomes and reasons for failure to achieve 
program objectives or for under-expenditure
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Misconceptions about budget savings
The situation: In 2011 the President 
issued a decree about budget savings 
(Inpres No.7/2011 on Budget Savings), 
as a reaction to wastage of public 
funds by ministries/agencies on such 
items as official travel and meetings in 
hotels. Ironically, the decree has turned 
out to be a contributor to low rates of 
absorption of budget expenditure, given 
that it fostered the misconception that 
budget savings should be sought during 
periods of budget implementation. The 
decree directed all ministries/agencies 
to save 10% of their budget spending 
ceilings and to re-allocate identified 
savings during the mid-year budget 
revision process. The result of these 
directives was that, given that budget 
revision occurs mid-year, ministries/
agencies had to work extra hard at 
spending re-allocated funds in the 
limited time remaining—in practice, 
less than six months. 
It has to be acknowledged that during 
discussions on the draft 2013 APBN 
the DPR and the government agreed 
on budget savings, in particular in the 
area of official travel. The problem is, 
however, that savings identified were 
reallocated to capital expenditure 
line items of ministries and agencies 
concerned. It is difficult to be confident 
that this strategy will be effective: 
after all, it is not clear that the 
ministries/agencies concerned have 
a genuine need for the reallocated 
funds. The approach also points to 
a budgetary mind set still oriented 
towards “inputs” or, in other words, 
dependence on levels of funding 
allocated. 
Recommendations: Savings should 
be identified at the beginning of 
the budgetary process: in that way, 
potentially wasteful expenditure can 
be identified at the outset and can be 
re-allocated to ministries/agencies or 
programs needing more funding; and 
expenditure of any extra funding—
potentially unable to be spent if re-
allocated mid-year—can be planned 
for when budgets are enacted. This 
recommendation requires that the 
Directorate-General of Budgeting 
should have the power to identify 
potentially wasteful expenditure items 
where savings can be made, including 
those with funding levels in excess of 
set standards. 
Such documentation is the norm for the 
European Parliament (see http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/document/ activities/
cont/201109/20110928ATT27791/201109
28ATT27791EN.pdf). The publication of 
such documentation in Indonesia would 
guarantee that budget-related politicking 
is transparent; it would also reduce the 
number of cases of budget manipulation 
for political purposes. The general public 
would also be able to evaluate DPR 
members in terms of their commitment 
to implementing a truly pro-people 
budget. 
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Performance-based budgeting is Half-Hearted: Present in budget 
Planning, but absent in end-of-Year fiscal reports
references
The situation: As part of its budget 
planning every ministry/agency puts 
together a document containing its 
Work Plans and Budgets (RKA-K/L) 
and performance indicators—targets to 
be met—for every program or activity. 
The end result is that every planned 
budget allocation can be matched with 
outcomes to be achieved. But it is a very 
different story in ministry/agency end-
of-year fiscal reports (LK-K/L): they 
say nothing about the extent to which 
budget expenditure has contributed to 
achievement of budget performance 
indicators. LK-K/Ls are purely 
administrative documents recording 
performance in absorption of budget 
funding by type of expenditure per 
organizational unit; and thus it cannot 
be ascertained from them whether actual 
expenditure succeeded in achieving 
outcomes originally budgeted for. In 
short, performance-based budgeting 
is being practised half-heartedly: it is 
present at the planning stage, but not 
when actual budgetary spending is being 
accounted for. Performance reporting has 
up to now been included in government 
institution performance accountability 
reports (LAKIP, for short) but these 
reports deal with issues other than 
budget realization. 
Recommendations: Performance-
based budgeting and inclusion of 
budget performance indicators should 
apply not only to Ministry/Agency 
Work plans and Budgets (RKA-
K/L) and Budget Implementation 
Checklists (DIPA), but also to 
Ministry/Agency end-of-year Fiscal 
Reports (LK-K/L). LK-KLs should 
present budget outcomes in the 
same format as RKA-K/Ls so that a 
comparison between actual spending 
and targets achieved would facilitate 
an assessment of the quality of budget 
performance. If that were done, 
ministries/agencies would no longer 
need to prepare separate performance 
reports. This recommendation could 
be implemented by amending Law No. 
17/2003 to specifically provide that 
recording of achievements based on 
performance should also be included 
in end-of-year fiscal reports of both 
central government ministries/agencies 
and regional government work units. 
Jon R. Blondal, Ian Hawkeswoth and 
Hyun-Deok Choi, 2009. Budgeting 
in Indonesia. OECD Journal on 
Budgeting.
Indonesian Budget Expenditure Oversight and 
Evaluation Team (TEPPA). Aktivitas 
APBN dan APBD. Status Per Triwulan 
II-2012. www.ukp.go.id 
1945 Constitution of Indonesia
Law No 17/2003 on State Finances:
www.anggaran.depkeu.go.id 
www.data.gov/opendatasites/ 
www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/
en/budg/publications.
html?id=BUDG00003#menuzone 
www.internationalbudget.org/what-we-do/
open-budget-survey/
www.opengovindonesia.org/
www.opengovpartnership.org/
www.perbendaharaan.go.id
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Tabulated summary 
no. Issues and Their Implications recommendations
1 Constitutional mandates are not yet fully reflected in 
budget law:
•	 The Law on State Finances does not reflect the 
Constitution’s intent that State budgets be formulated 
and implemented to maximize public welfare.
•	 That the intent of the Constitution that budgets be 
designed and implemented to maximize public welfare 
be included in the Law on State Finances or in lower-level 
regulations if revision of the law cannot be carried out 
immediately;
•	 That timeframes for judicial reviews of APBNs predate the 
commencement of the budget year in question.
2 The pro-forma nature of the House of Representatives 
(DPR)’s enactment of State budgets (APBNs): 
•	 DPR sectoral commissions and their ministry/agency 
counterparts continue to discuss budget details after 
enactment of APBNs in plenary session;
•	 This infringes the Law on State Finances: the DPR should 
approve APBN details on basis of proposed programs 
of activities;
•	 That the DPR’s enactment in plenary of APBNs should be 
its final decision on details contained in them
•	 That all documentation supporting APBNs (basic data, 
government financial statement and Presidential decrees 
on APBN details) be made an integral part of laws 
enacting APBNs.
3 No rules and regulations govern DPR processes to 
“optimize” budget allocations:
•	 Funds subject to DPR budget optimizing processes 
are liable to misappropriation and are not allocated 
effectively.
•	 That funds subject to budget optimizing processes be 
used only to make good areas of deficit within APBNs.
4 Certain APBN items are blocked (“asterisked”) by the DPR:
Such action is not provided for in law;
•	 It provides scope for secretive budgetary discussions;
•	 It also retards budget implementation.
•	 That the DPR not be permitted to “asterisk” certain parts 
of APBNs;
•	 That blocking budgetary allocations should be exercised 
solely by the Minister of Finance and should be no more 
than an administrative measure; 
•	 That parts of APBNs not yet agreed by the DPR be re-
discussed at the time of mid-year budget revision;
•	 That a parliamentary budget office be established to 
support the DPR.
5 The APBN’s system of rewards and penalties is not 
working well and its implementation is not transparent:
•	 Rewards are given at budget revision stage;
•	 This slows down budget implementation.
•	 That there be transparent quarterly progress reports on 
budget implementation;
•	 That rewards be paid out at the beginning of a fiscal year;
•	 That penalties be imposed at the budget revision stage;
•	 That penalties should also be applied to salaries of those 
charged with spending budget funds.
6 The half-hearted nature of budget transparency:
Details of APBNs are only made public when budget is 
enacted; 
Ministry/agency Work Plans and Budgets as discussed by 
the DPR are not published; 
The DPR does not hold public hearings on draft APBNs.
•	 That government publish Ministry/ Agency Work Plans 
and Budgets at the time of their submission to the DPR;
•	 That all budget documents published on websites be in 
open, usable format so that they can be handled easily; 
•	 That DPR sectoral commissions hold public hearings as 
part of discussion of APBNs.
7 Availability of budget planning information is piecemeal:
•	 Information on budget activities as planned/
formulated/implemented is not made available;
•	 Ministries/agencies use different software programs 
when compiling their budget information; 
•	 No information is available on adjustments to 
appropriations or performance indicators.
•	 That computer software used for presentation of 
information on budget planning/allocation/realization be 
standardized across government;
•	 That information systems be put in place to make it 
possible to track any given budget item including 
adjustments to appropriations and performance 
indicators;
•	 That documentation be made available on changes made 
to draft budgets during DPR discussions.
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Glossary of abbreviations
APBN Anggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja Negara (National) State budget
DAK Dana Alokasi Khusus Special Allocation Fund, a form of central fiscal transfers to regions
DAU Dana Alokasi Umum General Allocation Fund: a form of central fiscal transfers to regions 
DBH Dana Bagi Hasil Revenue Sharing Fund: a form of central fiscal transfers to regions
DIPA Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran State ministry/agency budget implementation checklist
DPR Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat House of Representatives: Indonesia’s national legislature. 
Renja K/L Rencana Kerja Kementerian/Lembaga Central government ministry/agency work plan(s)
RKA -K/L Rencana Kerja dan Anggaran Kementerian/Lembaga
Central government ministry/agency work plans and 
budgets
LKPP Laporan Keuangan Pemerintah Pusat Central government end-of-year fiscal report
LK-K/L Laporan Keuangan Kementerian/Lembaga Ministry/agency end-of-year fiscal reports
LRA Laporan Realisasi Anggaran Report/s on budget outcomes (realized budget)
no. Issues and Their Implications recommendations
8 Processes around budget savings are misunderstood:
•	 Wastage of budget funds occurs at time of budget 
formulation; 
•	 Savings are identified when budgets are being 
implemented;
•	 Savings are reallocated at the budget revision stage;
•	 This slows the rate of absorption of budget spending.
•	 That budget savings be identified at the budget 
formulation stage; 
•	 That savings be reallocated at the budget formulation 
stage; 
•	 That the Ministry of Finance have systems in place 
for identification and removal of potential waste of 
budgetary funds. 
9 Performance-based budgeting is half-hearted:
•	 Performance indicators are applied only at the budget 
formulation stage; 
•	 Actual performance levels cannot be determined on 
basis of budget allocation information in end-of-year 
budget realization reports;
•	 Government Institutional Performance Accountability 
Reports (LAKIP) do not fill the gap: they are separate 
documents and do not contain allocation details.
•	 That the extent to which performance indicators have 
been achieved be highlighted in budget realization 
reports;
•	 That LAKIP reports be integrated into budget realization 
reports.
Tabulated summary 
